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Resumen
A reasonable social objective of some impartial observer could be
providing people the possibility to achieve a better life. Achieving a
better life depends, in its turn, on the personal living conditions. Hen-
ce, offering the best distribution of conditions from a set of possible
distributions could be considered the mainstay of Development Theory.
Experts on development rank the possible social states that a society
could reach following different principles. These principles depend on
different criteria of what a good life is, as well as on different princi-
ples of Justice. We will see three scenarios where the rankings of social
states have been generally set. Linked to the third scenario, we offer
a ranking, which considers that a good life is a ‘full human life’. We
interpret living a full human life as the capability for self-sufficiency,
self-respect and agency. These three capabilities may be in conflict, so
that, we treat them lexicograhically. Last but not least, this ranking
supports the principle of equal opportunity for accessing a better life
as a principle of justice.
1. Introduction.
Whatever people’s ideas of well-living are, rational human beings design
their plans of life in order to achieve those ideas. Experts on development
tray to make easier the life in the regions of the world. One experts’ decision
could be providing people the possibility to carry out their plans of life.
However, this may not be an adequate end of development. What a person
considers is ‘good’ for her life may depend on factors out of her own res-
ponsibility. For example, these ideas may depend on their living conditions.
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in Public Economy at Universidad Pu´blica de Navarra, my advisors and, especially, I am
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What people have learnt from experience has a considerable bearing on the
way people understand life in general. And the way that people understand
life is often an important input for the generation of the ideas of good. If
somebody lives in terrible poverty, and everybody around lives in similar
conditions, she will probably accept this life as a good one.
If certain basic real freedoms are not guaranteed, people could maintain
ideas of good different to those that they would have if those freedoms would
have been provided. This is one of the main reasons why we believe people
are not always responsible of their ideas of good. Personal beliefs are so
easily influenced by living conditions that they should not be an input of
information neither for the application of distributive justice theories nor
for the development ones. Even more, it is well known that preferences are
sometimes manipulable, i.e. individuals not always have incentives to tell
the truth.
A reasonable social objective ought to be providing people the possibility
to achieve a better life, according to some impartial observer’s idea of good.
We will take one classical idea of what an impartial observer is, the one based
on the ‘veil of ignorance’ assumption1, also named ‘the original position’.
People do not know which position they will have in the society. In this
situation, they choose (a finite number of) principles, by which society will
be ruled. All things considered, there would be no reason to accept that the
’impartial observer’ is not responsible for her beliefs and to accept that she
will not declare her real beliefs.
Nevertheless, an important question is whether there are any dimen-
sions, also named resources of information or informational bases, on which
the features of good life should be set. Some of these dimensions have been
proposed in several fields of thought, such as Economics and Philosophy.
The common approaches to analyse the kind of life someone lives take three
dimensions (or sets of them): the dimension of utility, the set of dimensions
referred to resources and, nowadays, the set of dimensions referred to func-
tionings. Next, some of the main features of these three dimensions or sets
of dimensions are summarised.
Assuming utility quanta (word borrowed from Cohen (1993:9)) as a mea-
sure of utility, someone’s life could be measured by a quantity of quanta.
This quantity would show how a person’s desire has been fulfilled or how
happy she is or how her life is ranked according to her preferences, all de-
pending on the utility definition we used. Therefore, an impartial observer
would conclude that good lives are those linked to high quantities of utility
1See Harsanyi (1953), Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981).
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quanta. The impartial observer would also conclude that life improves when
there are gains in quanta.
Rawls, in his Theory of Justice, maintains a different approach and makes
use of several dimensions to measure the quality of life. They are primary
social goods dimensions, and can be summarised in five classes of dimensions:
‘rights’, ‘liberties’, ‘opportunities’, ‘powers’, and of ‘income and wealth’. The
life that someone can live depends on the access that she has to a certain set
of primary goods. A measure of her access to these goods reveals the quality
of life that she can achieved. Then, following these principles an impartial
observer would conclude that life improves when the access to those primary
goods is broadened.
Amartya Sen, going beyond Rawls’ approach, proposes another multidi-
mensional approach in order to analyse the quality of life. Instead of goods,
he chooses as dimensions existential features of life, what he calls ‘doings
and beings’. These existential features, such as being well nourished, being
disease-free, are generally called ‘functionings’. The life that someone can
lead depends not only on the access that she has to a certain set of primary
goods, but on what she can do and be using those goods (the combinations
of functionings that she can achieve using the goods). For instance, Sen uses
as an example, a diseased person can not absorb as many nutrients as a
healthy one from the same primary goods set. Consequently, life could be
seen as a combination of functionings achieved. Under this approach, an im-
partial observer would conclude that a good life would be linked to a certain
minimal set of functionings, and the way of improving life would be adding
valuable functionings.
2. Development Theories: the Application of some
Theories of Justice.
A plausible objective of an impartial observer could be that of enabling
people to achieve a better. Achieving a better life depends, in its turn, on the
personal living conditions. Hence, offering the best distribution of circums-
tances from a set of possible distributions (”social states”in the following) in
order to enable people to achieve a better life can be considered the essence
of Development Theory.
Actually, societies are continually going from a social state to another.
Policy makers modify or even accelerate the step to another social state,
designing adequate development strategies with that aim. All around the
world people hope with some degree of certainty, that their policy makers
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will take the view of an impartial observer when they decide to go to another
social state.
Even if we assume that the policy maker acts as an impartial observer
and that she has chosen the dimension to rank ideas of good life, the policy
maker would still have to choose a rule in order to compile the information on
how people can live in each social state. Thousands of people lead thousands
of lifestyles in thousands different conditions. Trying to have full information
over the different people conditions is an impossible mission in great part of
the world. This is one of the reasons why a social state is often summarised
taking into account only the information of a unique ‘representative person’
in the society. For example, sometimes the conditions of the ‘average’ person
is considered or, in other cases, the information of the worse situated person
is what is taken into account.
Now, the impartial observer, according to her ranking of life styles, and
taking the representative person conditions on each social state (whatever
representative is for her), will be able to rank different possible social states.
After having defined the social states ranking, she should delve into Econo-
mic Theory to decide the best way of going from a social state to another
(a strategy of development). This is not our concern in this work, we will
concentrate on the design of rankings. Actually, the final output of this work
is a proposal of a particular ranking social states.
There are at least two areas in Economics where experts propose rankings
of social states. These two areas are the area of Justice and the area of
Welfare. These rankings have some influence on the design of development
rankings. In some sense, it could be said that Development is the topic which
delves into human welfare and social justice. We assume, and I will show it
through three examples, that aims and strategies of development are linked
to the evolution of welfare and justice notions.
2.1. On the Utility Dimension: a Theory of Development
based on the Need to Achieve an Industrial Social State.
The roots of the Welfare Theory come from a scenario settled on the
dimension of utility. The welfare achieved by people can be measured by
utility quanta, whatever the definition of utility is: just as desires satisfied,
as preference or as happiness.
It was esasily accepted that more money allows people to have more
utility quanta and, therefore, to achieve more welfare. An inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith (1776) was
one of the first researches that treated on how to improve life in the regions.
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At the end of eighteenth century, the goodness of life was related to the
capability to consume. It was generally assumed that there are a resemblance
between welfare and wealth (opulence). Maybe this general feeling made
Smith write about wealth, one of the several means to improve life in regions.
This is not to deny in any way that he was aware of the fact that wealth
is only a mean for achieving welfare. This is more to say that his writings
are a fundamental mainstay for the opulence-based criterion for judging
development programmes. This criterion assumes that countries do better
on development when their real incomes per head grow faster.
In his inquiry, Adam Smith maintains that a nation will be better or
worse supplied ‘with all the necessaries and conveniences of life’ according
to the proportion between the income, which is produced by productive
work, and ‘the number of those who are consume of it’, (p.1). Indeed, life of
regions can improve when either productive workforce or productivity grow.
In this sense, it was possible to approach the welfare enjoyed by a region only
by inquiring how many people must live given a certain amount of wealth
that productive workforce has accumulated.
Some of Smith’s concerns are nowadays alive with the same essence; in
fact , they have been somehow adapted. For example, nowadays one of the
main concerns is related to the question of whether actual workforce will
be able or not to support those who do not work. A second intuition that
it is today alive as well is that regions offer more chances for a good life if
they are wealthier. Actually, Gross National Income (GNI) is the indicator
for classifying regions in the research works made by international organi-
sations, such as World Bank and United Nations. For example, World Bank
(2003:245) says that: ‘GNI per capita in U.S dollars to classify economies
for analytical purposes and to determine borrowing eligibility’.
Taking into account a resemblance between welfare and opulence, in the
early 60s, experts on development delved into the best way of increasing the
opulence of the region. Technological advances were assumed to be one of the
main instruments for getting the wealth growth. Technological knowledge
was, indeed, supposed to be a necessary condition for getting a spread of
welfare. It was thought that countries had to invest in technology in order
to get a better social state.
The lack of technological advances was supposed to be one of the reasons
for backwardness of some regions of the world. In the words of Nurkse (1953):
‘in all [poorer countries in the world today] their poverty is (. . .) attributable
to some extent to the lack of adequate capital equipment’. At the same
time, Buchanan (1964) addressed that, hopefuly, poor countries would have
a critical importance in the next years for the world affairs. He assumed that
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‘its muted or passive role in world affairs has been due to its technological
backwardness, and to the colonial control’. Poor countries could get over
their backwardness, once both questions were overcome. Furthermore, he
maintains that although people are often technologically underdeveloped in
these areas, they are ‘capable of acquiring all the skills and the techniques
to build great cities, convert bushland into farmland, to convert matter into
energy’.
Considering the significance that capital and technology have for deve-
lopment, Lewis (1955) warns policy makers about wasting capital. According
to Lewis, an adequate structure is necessary in order to use capital, in ot-
herwise capital will be wasted in the region (p.219)2. Following this idea,
Rostow (1959) emphasises the necessity of living a previous stage, before
introducing large amounts of technological advances. In this stage, the so-
ciety in the region would adapt. In his words: ‘it is [necessary] a massive set
of preconditions going to the heart of a society’s economic organisation and
its effective scale of values’. Rostow warns industrial revolution economists
about the importance of preparing the society ‘to respond actively to new
possibilities’.
The introduction of technological knowledge and capital was one of the
most important pushes for the regional industrialisation. Moreover, the re-
sults, which came from the first industrial revolution, showed the world that
industrial regions became the richest regions too. For this reason, industria-
lisation process comes to be the first strategy for development. In this sense,
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) maintains that industrialisation brings about a
boost of economy.
In fact, there are different ways of industrialisation. And, during the first
half of the twentieth century, economics of development were occupied on
designing different strategies for industrialisation; this is why it is called eco-
nomics of industrial revolution. Rosenstein-Rodan, Scitowsky, Nurkse and
Hirschman, on the one hand, and the structuralist line on the other, pro-
posed the main industrialisation thesis. From the first point of view, the
best way to achieve industralisation is by means of the international market
institution. Market was considered the adequate institution for achieving
regional industrialisation. However, they accepted the help of government
intervention. This support should target strategically the national and in-
ternational investment. Differences among authors come from the way in
which they consider that government’s behaviour ought to be. From the se-
cond point of view, it would better to achieve industrialisation on its own,
and not through the market or by international investment. United Nations
2page from Spanish edition: Teor´ıa del desarrollo econo´mico, Fondo de Cultura
Econo´mica, Me´xico (1958)
6
Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) and Rau´l Prebish es-
pecially, played a fundamental role in the origins of this line. During the
Havana Conference celebrated in 1947, it was said that countries should
produce what they were importing. Only governments should control the
industrialisation process.
In short, during the first half of the twentieth century, the thesis that
industrialisation and capital accumulation improve life in regions was accep-
ted. Also, the following ideas was accepted by all of them, the most suitable
strategy is that which gets the highest growth of wealth. The Gross National
Income (GNI) per capita was chosen as a natural index of the evolution of
wealth.
Some researches into the growth of GNI per capita were published du-
ring the 80s. They shared the same conclusions. In terms of product growth
and stability of industries, market strategies do better than no-market stra-
tegies3. We can consider that these kinds of results made the CEPAL, at
least, reconsider their early arguments for protection and advised market
strategies in what followed. As a consequence, many countries changed their
strategies, and they left market protection in order to have free market par-
ticipation.
Jagdish Bhagwati (1999) expresses his feeling about free traders having
won the war against the protectionist. Speaking in a broad sense, it could be
said that, ‘except for a few diehards, few today oppose free trade’. Nevert-
heless, Bhagwati (1996,1999) declares that we are living an ‘ironic reversal’.
Protectionists countries have become free trader countries today. At the sa-
me time and in the rich countries, it seems that a feeling against free trade
and other forms of globalisation is raising. The ironic reversal comes from
the fact that countries with less trade protection are those that opted against
free trade in the past, and the countries with high trade protection are those
that opted for free trade in the past. Two clear examples are the European
Union policies to protect the agricultural products (CAP) and the United
States Farm Bill.
2.2. On the Primary Goods Dimension: a Theory of Deve-
lopment based on the Need of Meeting Human Needs.
Dre`ze and Sen (2002:34) write: ‘when development economics emerged
as a distinct field of study, the subject had the appearance of being a bastard
child of growth economics’. As we have noted, an idea was baked during the
3For a deep research on this topic, see Chenery, et. Alt. (1986:358) and World Bank
(1987).
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first half of the twentieth century: the ranking of social states was based
on the income that they offer to the representative individual in the society,
which is supposed to be the average person. This idea has a fair justification.
In box n. one, we have compiled some results about longevity, premature
mortality and illiteracy from World Bank’s (2003) data. According to the
data, obviously, high-income countries show better results than low-income
countries on average.
Box 1
Regions
GNI p.capita
PPp*,2001
Life expectancy rate
at birth, years
2002
Low Income 2,040 59
Low and Middle Income 3,930 64
Middle Income 5,710 69
High Income 27,680 78
Regions
Under-5 mortality rate
per 1000 people,2000
Adult illiteracy rate
of people 15 and above,2000
Low Income 115 37
Low and Middle Income 85 25
Middle Income 39 14
High Income 7 ...
Note: *Purchasing power parity in USA dollars
Source: data from the World Bank (2003)
It seems clearly that it is better having more income than less. However
is it clear that grow income implies an improvement in terms of quality of
life?
Remembering Lewis’ warning, an adequate structure is needed to use
capital in order to avoid a capital waste. The same idea could be addressed
for wealth. A waste of wealth could easily happen in a socially handicapped
country, in which there was an overwhelming illiteracy and an extreme social
inequality, for example. In any case, the expresion ‘waste of wealth’ can be
interpreted in different ways, we will interpret it as an increasing in the
wealth without improving the representative individual living conditions.
Coming back to our example of a socially handicapped country, it is
needless to say that everybody might not participate of an income per head
expansion. It could even happen that the representative person does not par-
ticipate of it. The growth of income per head does not guarantee everybody
to be well nourished, disease-free or not having her life expectancy increased.
According to the World Development Report 2003, gross domestic product
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(GDP) average annual growth rate was 7.5 per cent between 1990 and 2001
in Mozambique (p.239)4. Let us note that the ‘average annual population
growth rate’ was 2.2 per cent for the same period (p.235). However, the
medium inhabitant enjoys less hospital beds per 1000 people that in 1980,
according to the 2002 World Development Indicators, (p.103). At the same
time, her access to primary education decreased. The World Development
Indicators show that the net primary enrolment ratio decreased from 47 per
cent in 1990 to 41 per cent in 1998 in Mozambique, (p.22).
The lack of correlation between the income growth and the longevity
growth is displayed in the following graphs.
Graphic .1.
Income growth-mortality decrease
Note: data for 19 regions
Source: data from the Worrld Bank (1985:199)
Industrialised regions with market economies
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Graphic .2.
Income growth-mortality decrease
Note:  data for 100 regions
Resoruce: data from the  World Bank (1985:198-9)
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4According to the World Development Report 2003, ‘GDP average annual growth rate
is calculated from constant price GDP data in local currency’, (p.22).
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Graphic .3.
Income growth-
life expectancy increase
(men)
Note: data for 19 regions
Resources: data form the World Bankl (1985:243)
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Graphic .4.
Income Growth-
life expectancy increase
(men)
Note: data for 100 regions
Resources: data from the World Bank (1985:242-3)
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The first and second graphs show the relationship between Gross Natio-
nal Income (GNI)5 per head average annual growth rate (from 1965 to 1983)
and gross mortality average annual growth rate for the same period. In the
third and fourth, the relationship between the GNI per head average annual
growth (from 1965 to 1983) and the growth of the life expectancy at born for
the same period is displayed. Graphs n. one and three refer to industrialised
countries with market economies. Graphs n. two and four refer to the rest
of the regions of the world.
Let us note that the data used belong to the World Development Report
1985. In this report, the World Bank warns about the problems and mistakes
that these data could have. Hence, we will only use them as an indication of
the true relation. Just with these data only, we cannot conclude that there
exits a relationship between the variables that we analyse.
The assumption that growth and development go together could cause
serious problems for the aim of improving people’s conditions. The problems
come from the fact that they do not share the same target. The target of
5Gross National Income (GNI) was called Gross National Product (GNP) before the
World Development Report 2002. World Bank replaced this name in order to fit with the
name used by the 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA), without any modification in
the meaning.
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development is to offer a better life, whereas the target of growth is to
offer more wealth. Even though people generally lead their lives in better
conditions in richer countries, there are not enough reasons to ensure that
income growth usually spreads the conditions that are generally accepted as
good for living.
As we have noted, in socially handicapped countries, not everybody
might participate of an income per head expansion. Buchanan (1964) shows
the following example. ‘Malaya’s per capita income was dollars U.S. 275 in
1957, which was among the highest in Asia. The country’s wealth, however,
is highly concentrated in the hands of a relatively small and in part non-
resident group’, (p.21). For these reasons, and in order to achieve a structural
change, policy makers often introduce, among others, some distributive in-
come policies. The distribution of income is frequently done through the
expansion of the access to some services, such as medical services, education
and security. This recognition does not entail that improvements in the qua-
lity of life cannot be realised through market forces. What this recognition
entails is that there are some circumstances which could require the govern-
ment intervention in order to avoid a waste of wealth, even if that wealth
has been produced through market forces.
Summing up, mixing the notions of development and income growth
may have the perverse effect of worsening of the general conditions of living.
This problem is shared by all the one-dimension approaches because while
a feature of the life conditions improves, another can get worse.
One of the steps in multidimensional approaches comes from the desire of
giving an increasing importance to the social features of the living conditions.
Although the importance of social features could be in the first development
economists’ minds, it can be said that these features conformed mainlines for
development strategies just after 1969. During the Society for International
Development (SID) World Conference celebrated that year, it was promoted
the need of ensuring the capability for meeting human needs.
At the same time, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was
trying to boost the basic human needs theory. It consists on defending that
can talk about regional development when people are better supplied in
terms of nutrition, access to an improved water source, basic education,
primary medical facilities and in terms of access to employment. Later on
time, the World Bank advised that people’s health (1994), work (1996) and
knowledge (1996) should be taken into account.
Each of these human needs can be seen as an informational dimension.
They form the scenario where the impartial observer will decide the ranking
of the possible social states. All in all, it seems that there is an agreement
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on the way of going from one social state to another. For doing well on
development, poverty, inequality and unemployment should be reduced. It
seems that policy makers wish rules of development based on some social
principles of Justice.
John Rawls, in his Theory of Justice, maintained that a society which
acts according to general social justice principles, should provide people with
the broadest access to the primary social goods. Providing primary goods
goes beyond the meeting of the quoted human needs. Primary social goods
are income and wealth, but they are also rights, liberties, opportunities and
powers. Hence, primary social goods are basic necessary means for achie-
ving whatever people’s rational plans. ‘With more of these goods men can
generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and
in advancing their ends, whatever these end maybe’ (p.92).
Rawls mentions that primary social good dimensions could be summa-
rised in only one, using an index of them. Again, an index can conceal
important information that the primary goods could have given. An analy-
sis of the information that they provide makes policy maker easier the role
of finding where the lack of the society is. It may be that a handicapped
society lacks of only one primary good, but, may be an important one.
Of course, Rawls’ proposal distinguishes between rights and liberties and
the rest of primary goods. An index could be done for goods with similar
social importance, but liberties have priority over that index in order to
agree a ranking for the social states.
Moreover, in Rawls’ theory, the multidimensional approach comes toget-
her with choosing the worse situated person in the society as the represen-
tative one. The underlying idea is the consideration of the need of universal
access to the primary social goods, or to certain goods needed for meeting
human needs, such as an employment, a minimum income or primary me-
dical facilities.
2.3. On the Functionings Dimensions: a Theory of Develop-
ment based on the Human Need of Freedom.
Even in the beginnings of Development Theory, the importance of free-
dom was present in the economists’ minds. For example, one of Lewis’ mo-
tivations for writing his Theory of Economic Growth is the expansion of
freedom for choosing the own life. Lewis wonders about the desirability of
income growth in the appendix. In his oppinion, one of the main advanta-
ges of growth comes up from the expansion of freedom of choice. Growth
of income will increase ‘the range of human choice’, that is their freedom
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(p.420). Maybe income is not a source of happiness; however, income ‘gives
man greater control over his environment’.
But, does income growth really spread the range of human choice? Even
though the growth of income allows society to promote social services, have
more free time and reach another necessities and conveniences of life, it
does not usually expand some other freedoms, such as political freedoms.
Depending on circumstances, it might be that they were dismissed as even
Lewis admits.
Clearly, it is difficult to imagine a sustainable process of increasing the
freedom of choice in a context of political and civil rights reduction. The in-
come growth does not necessarily entail the expansion of democracy’s prin-
ciples. And quoting Sen’s clear words (1999:52) ‘the rulers have the incentive
to listen to what people want if they have to face their criticism’. The way
of ensuring that people can make rulers face their criticism is to guarantee
political and social rights (especially those related to the guarantee of open
discussion, debate, criticism, and dissent). It may be that income growth
increase the set of things that can be done. But an expansion in the range
of human choice makes sense, indeed, when that expansion allows people to
achieve what they have reasons for wanting to have in an easier way.
Given that freedom is so important for human beings, Sen often wonders
why not focusing on the expansion of freedom instead of on one or a set
of means for the spread of freedom. We have seen that income can grow
while political freedoms decrease. In the same way, having the possibility of
meeting human needs6 does not entail having political freedoms guaranteed.
We could have a lack of real freedom in a region where basic needs are met:
a dictatorship where everybody were told what to do or be. For the design
of an approach where freedoms are the mainstays, Sen has researched into
people’s ‘agency freedom’. He wonders about the real freedom that a person
has to be an agent; that is, to act according to the ideas of the good that
she has reasons to promote.
The agency joined by an individual can be approached delving into
her capability for having access to valuable existential features (doings and
beings). These features are named functionings in Sen’s terminology as we
noted in the introduction. An expansion in the personal agency can bring
about not only an expansion in the freedom that a person has to achieve well
being7, but it also generates an expansion in the personal responsibility over
6We refer to ILO’s human needs definition and not Rawls’ primary social good notion
which included liberties.
7Let us take into account that it is also possible that an expansion in the agency
freedom does not cause an expansion in well being. Well being is referred to how well
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the own beliefs of good. Real freedoms allow people to gain responsibility
over their own ideas.
Consider that quality of life improves when people gain responsibility
over their lives (over their own ideas of good and also over their plans of life
chosen). In this case, an improvement of the quality of life could be provo-
ked by a modification in the person’s living conditions. Her living conditions
would have less influence on making up her ideas of good and also on her
choices. This point is also maintained by Marx. One of the features of Marx’s
ideal state consists on ‘replacing the domination of circumstances and chan-
ce over individuals by the domination of individuals over circumstances’,
(1846:190).
All in all, assuming that quality of life improves due to gains in respon-
sibility, agency freedom expansion could be seen as one of the objectives
of development. Agency freedom expansion, among others, can be achieved
due to the expansion on the set of achievable combinations of functionings.
Sen names this set individual capabilities. Needless to say, Sen’s proposal
consists on the expansion of the achievable combinations of functionings,
the capabilities expansion. 8.
3. Three Capabilities of a Full Human Life and
three Conditions for Ranking Social States.
We add two small contributions to the capabilities expansion line of
thought. On the one hand, we define three abilities that an impartial ob-
server would demand for characterising a full human life in the functionings
dimension. They are the capability for self-sufficiency, the capability for self-
respect and the capability for agency. On the other hand, we propose a way
of ranking social states based on the capability that people have to live a
full human life in them. The ranking is also based on equal opportunity
principles of Justice.
The first contribution has been explored in a previous paper [Echa´varri
(2003)]. In this paper, we assumed that a full human life could be portrayed
through the access to three abilities: the capability for being self sufficient
(self-sufficiency), the capability for being self respected (self-respect) and
the capability for being an agent (agency).
someone feels. Being an agent could make someone do or be something, which could
decrease her happiness, her pleasure, even her freedom to choose a personally more valued
option. This happens when someone acquires the freedom to accept a compromise which
decreases her freedom to choose other preferred option.
8Let’s see. among other works, Sen 1984a, 1984b, 1988, 1990, 1999
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When human beings suffer a lack of self-sufficiency, they can not get the
necessities and conveniences of life. They can only live in abject poverty, they
suffer from, for example, a lack in meeting either material needs (food, dress)
or immaterial needs (health, education). In situations like this, individuals
can not choose their plans of life. This reason makes them no responsible
over their plans of life. But even more, individuals sometimes can be no
responsible over their ideas of good life either. John Stuart Mill (1859:130)
wrote about the human need of choice for acquiring some human skills like
perception, judgement, discernment, mental activity and moral preference.
They are necessary skills for assuming the responsibility over the own beliefs.
Hence, it is a reasonable assumption that, for acquiring the responsibi-
lity over ideas of good life and for leading a full human life, people should
be guaranteed self-sufficiency. In other words, people should be guaranteed
capability for avoiding living in absolute poverty.
International organisations have established some criteria to evaluate
when people live outside the absolute income poverty range, which is a
particular area in the absolute poverty. They choose a particular poverty
line, set at 1 dollar a day 9 as the income with which people should have
access to live outside the absolute income poverty range.
Adam Smith referred to the relevance of not only surviving, but also
living with dignity. Quoting Smith (1776),
‘by necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are
indispensably necessary for the support of life, by whatever the
custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people,
even of the lowest order, to be without’ (p.399 of the book V).
The food leftovers or the clothes leftovers of some families could allow
other families survival. Nevertheless, for leading dignity lives, the access to
the market, the capability for acquiring those necessities of life by themsel-
ves and not only from charity, are needed. A lack of this capability would
make people appearing in public feeling ashamed. Smith(1776) explains that
somebody is ashamed when she lives on a poverty level that nobody could
fall into unless an extremely bad conduct carried out. We call self-respect, as
Smith did, at the capability for appearing in public without feeling ashamed.
Self-respect requires that individual capabilities are not far from the
capabilities that everybody in that society would consider as common ones.
9The World Bank (2003:246) declares that ‘the international poverty line, set at one
dollar a day in 1985 PPP [Purchasing power parity terms, has been recalculated in 1993
PPP terms at about 1,08 dollars.
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In other words, self-respect requires the access to certain combinations of
functionings; not having them would be considered as an example of an
extremely bad conduct.
Last but not least, we consider that individuals do not lead full human
lives if they suffer from a lack in agency. Let us remember that agency is
referred to the freedom of acting according to ideas of good that someone
is responsible for. Moreover, when a person is ensured her agency, ‘[their]
achievements can be judged in terms of her own values objectives’, quoting
Sen (1999:19).
In our minds these three abilities are needed to lead a full human life.
Leading a full human life entails the capability for assuming the responsibi-
lity for that life. People always can be no responsible either for their ideas
of good or for their plans of life, if they suffer from a lack of self-sufficiency,
self-respect and agency.
Conditions for ranking social states.
Let’s introduce some basic notation and definitions.
Consider a society consisting of n (∞>n>0) individuals. In what follows
we consider n as fixed. This society can reach a set of social states, deno-
ted by E with ∞>/E/>0. A social state, X∈E, is a distribution of living
conditions, with one and only one for individual. Let xi∈X denote the indi-
vidual i’s living conditions when X happen. Permutations in the individual’s
conditions does not entail being in another social state.
Let L be a set of essential functionings for the human life with /L/=l
(∞>l>0).
Let [0,1] be an interval in the real line and [0, 1]l be the [0,1] intervals in
the l-dimensional Euclidean Space. Let assume that there are a logic rule,
denoted Es, that assigns to each object in X one or several objects in [0, 1]l.
The interpretation of this correspondence is what follows:
Given a individual living conditions xi, the logic rule (an expert
system correspondence10) says what combinations of probabili-
ties of joining the functionings in L could be achieved by the
person i.
10Chiappero-Martinetti(1996), among others, approaches the capability that people has
of achieving a functioning using functionings based on the information from expert sys-
tems. She designs logic rules that demand information over personal circumstances (for
example: income, health, familiar structure, medical expenditure) to see whether she can,
or not, achieve certain functioning (for example: living a healthy life). We use the expert
system for a broader purpose.
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Depending on how she makes use of her conditions, it will be easier to have
more probability of achieving more of some of them and less of others. The
combination, or the set of combinations, that the rule Es links to xi will
be denoted by Ci. Remembering the Sen’s notion of individual capabilities,
we call ‘individual capability’ to the set, Ci. Note that we do not use the
Sen’s notion of capabilities to designate the set of achievable combinations
of functioning such as he does it. But we have borrowed it to designate a
set which share with it the same objective. Both approaches the capability
that people have for doing and being valuable things in life. In short,
Es: E → [0, 1]lxn
X → C ∈ [0, 1]lxn
xi → Ci∈ [0, 1]
l
Let us present an example in order to clarify some of these basic nota-
tion and definitions. There are two relevant functionings: L={have access
to an improved water source, be well nourised}. A society consisting of th-
ree individuals, 1,2 and 3, can achieve two social states E={X,Y}, where
X={x1,x2,x3} and where Y={y1,y2,y3}. The expert system correspondence,
Es, says that having for example the living conditions x1, the first indivi-
dual’s access to an improved water source is 0.7 and to a well nourishment
is 0.6. She can use in other way her living conditions, x1; so, her access
to an improved water source can be 0.3 and to a well nourishment can be
0.7. That is, when X happen, the first individual’s living conditions lets her
have a capability C1={(0.7,0.6),(0.3,0.7)}. Let C2 and C3 be what follow:
C2={(0.6,0.8)}, C3={(0.2,0.7),(0.7,0.6)}. And, finally, we would have the
same information for the social state Y.
Thus, we have a set E of social states and we wish them to be or-
dered over principles of real freedom expansion. The common rankings of
social states, which are based on the capabilities expansion principle are set
in equity principles of justice. Indeed, the Sen’s proposal makes up of the
school of egalitarian writers (as they have been named by Sugden(1998),
among others). Kranich’s (1995) proposal is the first of this type of ran-
kings. He ranks a set of opportunities (which could be capabilities) taking
into account the difference between the highest individual capability and the
smallest one on each social state. Little differences between these capabilities
are preferred to big ones from the Kranich point of view.
However, this may not be an adequate development strategy, at least, if
we interpret the Kranish’s principle in an extreme. May take the following
example: there is an strategy that improves the everybody’s probability of
achieving certain valuable functioning. Everything without alteration, this
strategy could be desirable, even though it would make the best situated
people get a bit more benefits than the rest of the people. The Kranich’s
rule would not see desirable this strategy.
17
Our intuition tells us that we should delves into the capabilities expan-
sion first and then into the inequality capabilities reduction, at least, in the
area of Development Theory.
There are another proposals in which social states rankings are based
on the common capabilities expansion. Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Nieto
(1997) characterise some rules for it. We follow the same intuition. Hence,
we assume that the representative individual’s capability is the common
capabilities in each social state. Let us define this set in the next.
Being {C1,. . .,Cn} the n individual capabilities when X happen, we will
consider the representative person’s capability as the intersection of the
individual capabilities. Let Cs denote this capability and let us call it ‘social
capability’.
Cs(X)={c∈[0, 1]l/ ∃ci∈Ci where i=1,. . .,n and where ciDc}, being D
the domination rule in the [0, 1]l space.
According to our example, the social capability in X would be the follo-
wing: Cs(X)={(0.2,0.7),(0.6,0.6)}. There would be another social capability,
Cs(Y), for the Y social state.
At this point, let us characterise the three reasonable capabilities de-
manded for accepting that a life is a full human life. They will be used as
conditions for ranking the social states in E.
Self-Sufficiency Condition: Let α ∈ [0, 1]l be a vector. Each element
in this vector symbolizes a probability of achieving each functioning in L.
Consider an impartial observer assume this vector as a line for sufficiency.
Dominated vectors in some of their elements would not guarantee sufficiency
from the impartial observer’s point of view. Everybody is supposed to have
capacity for self-sufficiency in a social state X when α ∈ Cs(X).
Self-Respect Condition: Let β ∈[0, 1] be a rate. The impartial obser-
ver considers that people ought to have access to a β rate of the others’ life
for living with dignity. Everybody has capacity for self-respect in X when
for all ci ∈ Ci where i=1,. . .,n; βci∈Cs(X).
Agency Condition: Let assume that the agency joined by an indivi-
dual can be approached delving into their capability to access to valuable
functionings. Let assume as well that the capacity for agency is proportio-
nal to the capability area, where Cˆ denotes it. Everybody has at least the
capacity for agency that the areas of the social capability, Cˆs, shows.
Consider these abilities as conditions for ranking social states. Let note
first of all that the three conditions may conflict each other; hence, we treat
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them lexicographically in the next. Take into account for it that R denotes
a preordering in E with its asymmetric and symmetric parts of it denoted
with P and I, respectively. Let us suppose that there are two social states
X,Y∈E:
XPY ⇔ α∈Cs(X) and α/∈Cs(Y).
If α∈Cs(X) and α∈Cs(Y), XPY ⇔ Cˆ(X)>Cˆ(Y).
If α∈Cs(X) and α∈Cs(Y) and Cˆ(X)=Cˆ(Y), XPY ⇔ for all ci∈Ci where
i=1,. . .,n; βci∈Cs(X) and ∃c
′
i
∈C ′
i
where i=1,. . .,n; βc′
i
/∈Cs(Y);
in this case, XIY ⇔ for all ci∈Ci where i=1,. . .,n; βci∈Cs(X)and for all
c′
i
∈C ′
i
where i=1,. . .,n; βc′
i
∈Cs(Y).
Note we demand guaranteeing self-sufficiency condition in the first place.
The reason why we do it comes from the importance of accessing to some
basic functionings for conforming the own beliefs (the individual’s ideas of
good, and of good life in particular). Self-sufficiency is a needed condition
for being responsible over the own ideas.
We demand capacity for agency in second place. The cause for it is that
we support the idea that development ought make people responsible not
only over their beliefs, but also over their acts. Agency is a needed condition
for being responsible over the plans of life chosen.
And last, the fact that self-respect is considered in third place does not
necessarily imply that it is less important for living a full human life. Capa-
city for self-respect, or living with dignity, is one of the needed conditions
of a full human life.
4. Conclusion
A reasonable social objective of some impartial observer is providing
people the possibility to achieve a better life. Hence, offering the best social
state from a set of possible social states with this purpose could be consi-
dered the mainstay of Development Theory. Experts on development rank
the possible social states that a society could reach following different prin-
ciples. These principles depend on the supported idea of what a good life is
and as well on principles of Justice. We have seen three scenarios where the
rankings of social states have commonly set. Linked to the third scenario, we
have offered a ranking, which considers a good life is a full human one. Li-
ving a full human life requires the capability for self-sufficiency, self-respect
19
and agency from our point of view. Because demanding these three abilities
as conditions for ranking social states conflict each other, we have deman-
ded them lexicographically. Last but not least, this ranking supports the
principle of equal opportunity to access a better life as principle of justice.
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